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Analysis of Extremism and Terrorism: A Study from Pakistan's Perspective

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ABSTRACT

Due to its complex dynamics, which include a variety of targets and motivations, the use of cutting-edge weapons, the occupation of larger territories, the destruction of essential infrastructure, and the claimed deaths of a large number of people, terrorism in Pakistan has attracted significant local and international attention. This study investigated terrorism from Pakistan's viewpoint at this important historical turning point. It considered the complex interactions between various factors that have contributed to the tremendous hardship brought on by terrorism in the country. A qualitative research approach was applied in this study. The primary goal of the study was to conduct a critical analysis of the Taliban and determine what drives them to incite fear throughout the nation under various circumstances. Critical analysis was performed by asking people about multiple situations and examining their responses. According to the findings, the Taliban abused Islamic morality and stoked hatred toward it. Pakistan needs to do more to support radicalized citizens and prisoners of war by offering incentives and a conducive environment. As a result, a range of reform-related worries and recommendations are presented from the viewpoints of the authorities, madrasa administrators and instructors, and muftis.



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1. Introduction

Terrorism is famously difficult to define. However, the majority of definitions centre on acts of illegal, widespread violence mainly intended at civilians. This kind of violence, which aims to affect social and national change, is often (but not always) motivated by political, religious, or intellectual views (Rashid, 2008). Nevertheless, the international community has not yet agreed upon a precise definition of terrorism: As mentioned by Ahmad et al. (2022), the United Nations General Assembly defines political terrorism as “political violence in an asymmetrical conflict that is designed to induce terror and psychic fear (sometimes indiscriminate) through the violent victimization and destruction of noncombatant targets (sometimes iconic symbols).” For terrorists, the media is a tool for reaching both immediate and distant political objectives, as well as their desired long-term ends. The goal is to gain as much publicity as possible to influence the intended audience(s).

Given the political and emotional weight of the term "terrorism," it is difficult to provide a clear definition (Ahmad, 2008). The state's efforts to protect its citizens from terrorism may backfire and result in further social oppression, which may incite new terrorist actions (Ahmed, 2013).

Pakistan is a prime example of a nation whose citizens, government, neighbours, allies, and friends have had divergent and sometimes contradictory opinions on how to confront terrorism for an extended period effectively. In a surprising turn of events, Pakistan is seen as both a global leader in the fight against terrorism and a supporter of that effort. After vigorously fighting terrorism for more than a decade, its allies and government are now attempting to reach a compromise with terrorist organizations (Ahmed, 2013).

This study examines terrorism from Pakistan's perspective at this crucial juncture in history. It takes into consideration the intricate interaction of several elements that have led to the immense suffering inflicted on the nation by terrorists. The article also considers the country's unique and advantageous geopolitical position, which has resulted in a unique anthropological experience as a result of its role as a corridor for ancient Greeks, Arabs, Mongols, Turks, Afghans, and Iranians to reach Delhi, the capital of India and the power centre of the subcontinent, for thousands of years. We also explore the psychological, social, and religious vulnerabilities of the Pakistani population, which may increase their likelihood of both supporting and being victims of terrorism.

2. Geopolitical Scenario

Pakistan occupies the region between 24 degrees North and 37 degrees South, 67 degrees East and 75 degrees East, constituting the subcontinent's northwest quarter. To the north and northwest, it has a 1,200-kilometer border with Afghanistan, most notably the one-kilometer-wide, porous Wakhshir strip, while to the east, it shares a border with India (1,950 km). To the south of the Persian Gulf is the Arabian Sea, while to the southwest is oil-rich Iran. In addition, Pakistan and China share a northern border (600 km). Pakistan's position at the intersection of central, south, and southwest Asia provides it the most direct route from the Persian Gulf's oil wealth to China. Afghanistan may connect to Russia and Central Asian nations via its forthcoming natural harbour in Gwadar.

Pakistan consists of the provinces of Sindh, Punjab, Baluchistan, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the disputed area of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, and the capital city of Islamabad (World Health Organization, 2009). Pakistan, as mentioned by Lynch et al. (2013), “is home to a range of landscapes, including K2 and other

high mountains, deep valleys, the rich plains of the world's oldest civilization in the Indus Valley, and the deserts of Sindh and Balochistan. Pakistan ranks sixth in population size, with 180,808,000 people.” This number is anticipated to double to 410 million by 2045, with a population density of 229 people per square kilometer.

There is the potential for offshore oil and gas resources, 700 kilometers of coastline, and access to the Indian Ocean, through which most international traffic passes. Two major Pakistani seaports, Karachi and Gwadar, are fewer than 3,000 kilometers from the Chinese border. Western and southern China, particularly the Xinjiang area, are now the focal point of China's economic expansion. China and other landlocked Central Asian nations have a unique chance to trade on the Indian Ocean via Pakistan.

The Pakhtuns (natives of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa area) are growing increasingly exposed to al-Qaeda and the Taliban of Afghanistan, presenting the biggest geopolitical danger to Pakistan. The separatist movement in Balochistan, which terrorist organizations support, is impeding the province's attempts to extract maximum value from its mineral, oil, and gas deposits. These parties threaten to build a gas pipeline to Iran and a corridor connecting China to the port of Gwadar.

Terrorism has persisted over the past decade for a variety of reasons, including the world's growing population, widespread poverty, illiteracy, poor health conditions, severe power shortages, untapped natural resources, a fragile industrial and agricultural infrastructure, a lack of financial resources, and the ongoing war on terrorism.

3. Evolution of Terrorism in Pakistan

Since September 11, 2001, Peshawar, the city of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, has been the epicenter of terrorism in Pakistan. The biggest damage has occurred in northwest Pakistan, around the border with Afghanistan (KPK). The renowned "Khyber Pass" in KPK was traditionally used by armies assaulting the subcontinent and India from the northwest. Throughout history, the inhabitants of this region of Pakistan have seen several battles and conflicts, observed numerous weapons, and encountered innumerable warriors. Weapons and ammunition are often traded between combatants.

Pakhtun men are not regarded as properly attired unless they are armed. People do experience a "naked" sense when they lack it. Numerous conservative segments of this complex community subscribe to a religion that forbids women from seeking higher education or working outside the home. These factors must be linked to the collective unconscious (Carl Jung) of the mostly Muslim people, particularly the Pakhtun tribes, who have resided in the northwest of Pakistan for decades.

There are parallels between the present rebellion and one that happened in the nineteenth century under Sikh rule and was led by clerics Shah Ismail and Syed Ahmed Barevli (1786-1831). These two religious leaders regarded themselves as holy warriors battling for the propagation of Islam. Several Pakhtun tribes united under Syed Ahmed's leadership as the self-proclaimed Amir ul Momineen armed themselves and confronted the Sikhs' superior military force (Head of the Believers). They compelled the locals to follow their concept of Sharia (the Islamic way of life) and abandon their traditions. In addition, they imposed a 10% Ushr income tax on all people (a form of taxation introduced in the early years of Islam).

By the 1820s, they had annexed hundreds of villages in the Peshawar region. They were able to increase their power by repelling Sikh armies from their fortress in Akora (today, the location of one of Pakistan's largest religious seminaries, whose alumni include Mullah Umar, the former Taliban ruler of Afghanistan). This movement gathered momentum in the Swat region of KPK. In the same region, the

current leader of the Taliban in Pakistan, Fazal Ullah, and his father-in-law, Sufi Muhammad, fought the Pakistani government from 2002 to 2009 in an attempt to establish a parallel Islamic state.

When Ranjeet Singh (1780-1839) joined forces with local tribal chieftains in a fight at Balakot in the Hindu Kush mountains, the movement was finally crushed. In the early nineteenth century, the growth of Sikh militias led to the foundation of the Sikh State. Muslims today regard the two priests who perished in the Battle of Balakot as martyrs. Consequently, this area's present insurgency and militancy have centuries-old historical origins and strategic motives. During the era of Pakistan's independence in 1947, extreme Hindu and Sikh gangs engaged in extortion and fanaticism by murdering, torching, robbing, raping, and torturing Muslim refugees. Those who saw these atrocities still retain strong memories of the horrors they witnessed. Between 14 and 18 million people were displaced, and a million presumably perished as a result. Five hundred thousand to eight hundred thousand people perished, and 10 million were displaced in the province of Punjab alone (Ahmed, 2013). Since World War II, this was the first occasion in Pakistan when ethnic cleansing was carried out in reaction to terrorist acts.

Since 1947, Kashmir has been the location of a territorial struggle between Pakistan, Kashmiri terrorist groups, and India. The Kashmir problem sparked at least three conflicts between India and Pakistan in 1947, 1965, and 1999. This topic has often been a catalyst for terrorism and other violent activities. Armed insurrection in Kashmir prompted the establishment of militant wings, which is often recognized as the genesis of the mujahideen insurgency. India attributes the start of the insurgency to Afghan mujahideen, who infiltrated the Kashmir valley after the conclusion of the Soviet-Afghan war.

In the 1960s, the "Mukti Bahni Movement" in eastern Pakistan sought the construction of a distinct Bengali homeland, and it was marked by intimidation and bloodshed (the native people of East Pakistan) (Meher, 2015). It was a classic illustration of how counterterrorism measures may exacerbate terrorist behavior. Since 1971, a new nation called Bangla Desh has emerged there (The homeland of the Bengalis). Despite this, Bangla Desh supported the employment of similar terrorist tactics by separatist groups in Pakistan's Balochistan and North West Frontier, as well as the provision of foreign funds for these organizations. A behavioural model proposes that the causes and effects of these events may have resulted in both operant and classical conditioning for using violent means to attain political objectives.

In the years after 1971, governments implemented steps, particularly in Sindh and Balochistan, to fight what they saw as threats to national security. The incursion of the Soviet Union into Afghanistan in 1979 instigated the United States, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and China to extend their support to insurgent factions engaged in combat against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, which had received backing from the Soviet Union. Additionally, these nations extended foreign assistance to mujahideen and other rebel factions throughout Afghanistan. A significant number of Arab volunteers, commonly referred to as "Afghan Arabs," were drawn to the conflict, including Osama bin Laden.

Since Pakistan and Saudi Arabia were the first and maybe only nations to recognize the Taliban administration in Kabul as legitimate, the original meaning of the humanist Rogerian idea of "unconditional good regard" has been greatly expanded. Afghanistan's civil society rejected this "respect and recognition" of a terrorist outfit that destroyed Buddhist artefacts, mistreated women, closed girls' schools, and rapidly and intentionally crushed progressive values.

Throughout the Afghan struggle, the United States provided the mujahideen with the most modern weapons, and many clerics and students of madrassas (seminaries often affiliated with mosques for giving religious education) were among the mujahideen. They returned to their homes in Punjab and Sindh after

their time-fighting in Afghanistan, armed and experienced. In the heart of the Punjab, far from the Afghan border, a "new authority" formed to challenge the feudal lords and entrepreneurs who had hitherto controlled rural and suburban life. Most of these clerics frequently accepted foreign funding to build existing madrassas, which in the post-9/11 period became incubators for future terrorists (Ali et al., 2021). The authors suggest that several administrations turned a blind eye while terrorist organizations normalized and assimilated into mainstream society. In contrast, evangelical organizations that serve both men and women provide a great cover for young people to be convinced by terrorist organization leaders to pursue a violent lifestyle. Political and religious leaders of the nation never publicly condemned the systematic recruiting of young men throughout the country to serve as suicide bombers and jihadi warriors.

Using the 9/11 attacks as justification, NATO and its allies fought in the political conflict in Afghanistan to eradicate the terrorist organization al-Qaeda and replace the Taliban government, which at the time controlled 90% of the country. Following the effective overthrow of the Taliban administration by the United States and its allies, the majority of al-Qaeda and Taliban militants fled to neighbouring Pakistan or hid in distant rural or mountainous areas. NATO soldiers continued to combat the Taliban insurgency, and the conflict spread into neighboring northwest Pakistan.

As points out by Hajam (2019), "Several Afghan War-era mujahideen organizations, including Lashkar-e-Taiba, Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, have subsequently reemerged (TTP)." They initiated attacks against the state by murdering citizens and police officers for political reasons, making them the biggest danger to Pakistan and its people.

Between September 11, 2001, and May 2011, at least 35,000 Pakistanis were murdered in terrorist assaults, according to estimates. This comprises 164 individuals from 2003 and 3,318 from 2009 (Malik & Zaman, 2013). The government of Pakistan estimates that the nation lost around USD 68 billion between 2000 and 2010 owing to the direct and indirect expenses of terrorism (Bano, 2007).

Popular culture has shown a callous and pathological "la belle indifference" since the late 1990s, which has had a chilling influence on civic life and the political apparatus. Even while the majority of Pakistanis are committed to freedom, progress, democracy, a pluralistic worldview, tolerance, and peace, many aspects of Pakistani culture are deeply imbued with retrograde, fundamentalist, and pagan beliefs. Those at risk of becoming a terrorist target need further knowledge of the psychological and social implications of these macroscopically significant changes.

4. Research Methodology:

The present study employed a qualitative research methodology. To complete the research paper, the will extensively examine a diverse range of scholarly resources, including the writings of both local and international legal scholars and unpublished materials. This study presents an assessment of a document sourced from the aforementioned reference. (i) Primary sources like different articles, newspapers, and interviews of authentic journalists. (ii) Secondary sources include books, reports, the internet, journals, and newspaper articles.

5. Literature Review

Pakistan is frequently described as the most dangerous location on Earth. Terrorism might be considered a contributing element. Despite Pakistan's nuclear weapons, terrorist strikes constitute a significant danger

to the government's authority and the safety of its 180 million residents. Foreign security analysts (Berko, 2019) now see the weakening of Pakistan's governmental authority and the disintegration of its judicial institutions as a nightmare scenario.

The origins of contemporary terrorism in Pakistan may date back to the 1980s. Changes in international politics at the time affected the political future of Pakistan. The three most notable were the Iranian Revolution of 1979, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, and the Muhammad Daud coup in neighbouring Afghanistan in 1973. In addition to Pakistan's opportunistic internal politics, these events contributed to the geopolitical environment that gave rise to Pakistan's violent political upheavals.

After deposing Afghanistan's King Zahir Shah (15 October 1914–23 July 2007) in 1973, Muhammad Daud began to stake his claim to the Pashtun regions of Pakistan (Berman et al., 2019). This implied Islamists hostile to the Kabul administration had Islamabad's implicit blessing. In 1978, the culmination of Afghanistan's internal political turmoil was a communist coup. In 1979, however, communist rivalry and a burgeoning Islamist uprising led to the Soviet invasion (Bloch, 2020). When the 40th Red Army of the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, vibrations could be felt from Kabul to the furthest corners of the planet.

During this time, Pakistan's internal politics were equally difficult. Following the coup of General Zia ul Haq in 1977 and the killing of elected Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in 1979, the Islamabad military junta was driven into exile. Unfortunately for everyone concerned, Pakistan's political and security worries led to terrible policy decisions (Blomberg, 2007).

In a desperate bid to maintain its political legitimacy, the government led by General Zia began an Islamization drive and battled the Soviet Red Army front-on. General Zia's military reign featured a variety of religiously motivated initiatives, including backing for religious militias, promotion of religiously biased education, and enforcement of legislation like the Zakat Law. This sprinkling of Islamism assisted General Zia's dictatorship in gaining domestic and international support, particularly in the strong Gulf States such as Saudi Arabia. Some experts hold Islamization responsible for the escalation of religious conflicts in the nation (Cockcroft et al., 2009).

As a result of the tight partnership between Delhi and Kabul at the time, national security experts started to portray Pakistan as being ringed by India. In the event of a battle with India, having a sympathetic administration in Kabul was believed to provide “strategic depth” (Christine Fair, 2007).

Throughout this decade, terrorism in Pakistan was blamed on the situation in Afghanistan. At this time, it was commonly thought that terrorist operations were sponsored by the Afghan Intelligence (KHAD) or Russian Intelligence (KGB) organizations. To murder as many people as possible, terrorists in the main towns of Pakistan's formerly designated Northwest Frontier Province (which borders Afghanistan) favoured attacking packed public spaces.

At the same time, the Iranian revolution headed by Khomeini was gathering momentum, revealing rifts between the majority Shiite Iranian government and the Sunni Gulf governments. This sectarian fight for regional hegemony was also waged on a terrorist proxy battlefield inside Pakistan's borders. An enthusiastic Sunni monarchy in Saudi Arabia offered financial assistance for Zia's Islamization measures and Afghan Jihad activities. Tensions worsened when the governing junta in Pakistan started imposing Islamic policies that the Shiite minority saw to be Sunni-oriented (Gardner, 2018). Iran's answer was to attempt to establish influence among Shiites by offering help to the community. As a consequence of the ensuing sectarian conflict, from Karachi in the south to the Kurram Agency in the north, some of the

deadliest clashes between Sunni and Shiite armies in history broke out.

Long before the partition, ethnic strife in Pakistan existed, but it intensified during the Afghan Jihad and became the predominant type of terrorism in the 1990s. Not only was this violence more prevalent than the sectarian terrorist attacks of the 1990s, but it was also primarily restricted to the south.

When the United States initiated Operation "Enduring Freedom" in Afghanistan, attacks on civilians surged again after having decreased at the turn of the century. The government of Islamabad, commanded by General Musharraf, opted to support the United States in its war against the Taliban.

Pakistan started getting large sums of economic and military help as soon as it opted to join the United States. It has risen to a total of \$10 billion by 2007. Due to the presence of the superpower, Pakistan is now compelled to face the ugly reality of the country's ongoing and escalating terrorism. Since the 2003 invasion of Wana and the 2007 assault on the Red Mosque, terrorist assaults have increased. This decade was characterized by numerous acts of terrorism with disregard for human life. Due to the intensifying conflict in Baluchistan, terrorism has taken on a new nationalist component.

This summary demonstrates that terrorism in Pakistan is complex, originating from a variety of sectarian and nonsectarian political players with religious reasons as well as ethnic and national actors with their objectives. There have been instances and locations in Pakistan when each of these forms of terrorism was the most prevalent. Recent developments in data collecting and analysis have enabled academics to apply statistical approaches to Pakistan's convoluted history of terrorism. This research utilizes data collected from the South Asian Terrorism Portal and the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) (SATP). Using data from both sources, the authors have built a more complete picture of sectarian terrorism 15 and terrorism in Pakistan.

6. Non-International Armed Conflict:

In several ways, terrorist threats are degrading and ruining Pakistan's economy. Terrorism in Pakistan has attracted considerable local and international attention due to its complex dynamics, which include a wide variety of targets and motivations, the use of cutting-edge weapons, the occupation of larger territories, the destruction of vital infrastructure, and the claimed deaths of a large number of people (civilians, army personnel, foreigners, etc.). Studies on the roots of terrorism in Pakistan have been published (Haleem & Masood, 2022) as a consequence. Pakistan's efforts to combat terrorism, Pakistan's status as a state-sponsor of terrorist activities, Pakistan's effectiveness as a U.S. ally in the war on terror, Pakistan's Jihad Culture, Madrassa Culture, sectarian terrorism, and the impact of terrorism on investment and economic development (Hoffman, 2018).

From 1972 to 1991, there were 150 terrorist incidents, the most of which occurred in Sindh (77) and Punjab (36). (34). Due to the convergence of sectarian and linguistic types of terrorism in Pakistan, several assaults happened (Horgan, 2008).

Through 1993, there was a drop in terrorist incidents, followed by a slight uptick in 1994. The number of terrorist events increased dramatically in 1995, jumping from 154 in 1994 to 666 in 1995, with 630 of those occurrences happening in the province of Sindh alone. Terrorism fueled by language problems was particularly prevalent in Karachi and its neighbouring city, Hyderabad (Jacques & Taylor, 2008). In 1996, there were 180 terrorist attacks, compared to 37 in 1998 and 206 in 1997. Due to the government's strong fight against linguistic terrorists and other sectarian organizations, Karachi was at peace from 1998 to 2005. The incidence rate rose from 165 in 2006 to 257 in 2007 and 552 in 2008. As in 2009, 2010, and

2011, the most violent manifestations of terrorism emanated from ethnic groups in Baluchistan and Sindh and the Taliban in the northwest and tribal regions. The effects of terrorism in different areas of Pakistan vary considerably.

6.1. Drone Attacks in Pakistan

Since 2004, the United States has used drone operations in Pakistan to target terrorists. Each year, despite Pakistan's greatest attempts to avoid them, more attacks occur. Between 2009 and 2012, a senior Obama administration official said that the United States was responsible for the deaths of twenty of the top thirty al-Qaeda commanders in Pakistan and Afghanistan. According to the New America Foundation, 28 top al-Qaeda members were among the 51 terrorist leaders killed by drone operations in Pakistan between 2004 and 2012. Since July 2008, the United States has launched frequent airstrikes on Taliban and Al Qaeda targets in Pakistan. Since the project started in 2004, there have been 325 strikes, with 315 occurring after January 2008. Some say that drones raise the worldwide terrorist threat by encouraging individuals, including the loved ones of those slain, to fight jihad against the United States and its allies based on unsubstantiated and false accounts of civilian deaths (Imran et al., 2018).

6.2. War on Terrorism and Cost of Terrorism in Pakistan

The War on Terror has repercussions for Pakistan's economy. Pakistan's economic development has slowed in recent years due to internal and international financial problems. Security forces in neighbouring Afghanistan's Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA) have launched a war on terrorism, compounding the country's internal problems (FATA). Since 2006, there has been a significant disruption in economic activities in Pakistan as the War has infiltrated the country's well-established neighbourhoods like a contaminant. According to Pakistan's Economic Survey (2010-2011), the war has resulted in the deaths of more than 35,000 people, the displacement of more than 3 million natives, the destruction of infrastructure, a decrease in investment activities, a decrease in production, and an increase in unemployment. It has effectively halted economic activity in many parts of the country. Recovery efforts for internally displaced persons and the fight against terror sapped government finances, resulting in a rising budget deficit and impeding economic development. Pakistan has never previously seen such terrible social and economic upheaval, not even after its horrific war.

Significant economic and security repercussions persisted for Pakistan. Over the last many years, it has committed a significant portion of its material and human resources to this conflict. From \$13.6 billion in 2009-10 to \$17.8 billion in 2010-11, the economy had to contend with significant increases in direct and indirect expenses, and it is anticipated that these costs would continue to climb in the coming years.

Pakistan's participation in the war on terror over the last decade has cost the government \$67.93 billion (Rs.5037 billion). In conclusion, terrorism retards growth and depletes economic resources. However, if effective counterterrorism measures are implemented, they may have a major positive impact on the economy by mitigating the negative consequences of decreased trade and investment, which would otherwise limit the economy's long-term development. Therefore, Pakistan needs enormous financial resources to boost the economy's productive potential. In the future, the pace of economic expansion will be determined mostly by enhanced safety conditions.

6.3. Trends in Terrorism (1981–2010)

The average number of terrorist attacks in Pakistan has increased (Figure 1). The expanding distance between the two arcs in the diagram illustrates the growing damage caused by terrorist acts. Numerous rises in the death toll correspond with politically significant events. For example, the first high (1986–1988) happened towards the conclusion of the most difficult period of the Afghan Jihad. The second peak coincided with the military's attempts to halt ethnic unrest in Karachi in 1995-1996. The third increase is the result of rampant sectarian terrorism throughout the country. During this period, Nawaz Sharif launched a significant offensive against sectarian rebels. The height of these two peaks represents the force and opposition these militant organizations had amassed to confront the state's repression.

The third peak (2006-2007) came with the commencement of military operations in Wana in 2004. As a result of the 2009 attack on the Red Mosque in the nation's capital, terrorism hit an all-time high. The reader may have seen that the gap between events and fatalities widened considerably after September 11th. The rational-actor theory explains this process more effectively. During the period, suicide bomber attacks were prevalent. State attempts to impose their will via repression and military operations were opposed by terrorists using suicide bombing as a more sophisticated and cost-effective technique to accomplish the same goals (less chance of being captured)

During the 1980s, terrorist attacks climbed by a factor of more than 15. After the Afghan Jihad, terrorism developed and became more focused, less murderous, and less pervasive. This is reasonable, given the nature of terrorist strikes during this period. This period was characterized by terrorist attacks motivated by racial and religious prejudice. Terrorists who attack civilians based on their ethnicity or religion have no desire to hurt their people. In response, current terrorist assaults have evolved to become more sophisticated, more targeted, and ultimately less fatal.

Throughout the War on Terror, there was a significant rise in the proportion of attacks that led to deaths. According to Gaibullov and Sandler (2019), “there was a significant increase of approximately 500% in the annual average number of casualties per event during the 1980s.” The trend above suggests a rise in politically motivated terrorism in recent times, leading to the utilization of progressively efficient and detrimental terrorist methods, such as suicide bombings.

Since there have been sectarian, non-sectarian, religious, nationalist, and ethnic terrorist actions in Pakistan, the nation has been at the centre of terrorism-related issues. In Pakistan, six to five individuals have perished in each episode of non-sectarian terrorism in the past. Contrary to common assumption, sectarian violence has been more fatal than non-sectarian violence during the last decade, as shown by the darker bar. This is because, in sharp contrast to past decades, the use of suicide bombers for sectarian assassinations surged throughout the 2000s (Khan, 2009).

6.4. Afghan Jihad (1981–1989)

Pakistan's involvement in the Afghan Jihad marked the beginning of a new, catastrophic chapter in the country's experience with terrorism (Lankford, 2019). This decade saw not one but two waves of simultaneous terrorist strikes. As a method of pressing Pakistan to halt its backing for Afghan insurgents, Soviet and Afghan intelligence services designed and executed the majority of the strikes. The most violent time of the Afghan Jihad it happened as it came to a close. These strikes were primarily aimed at Peshawar, the epicenter of the Afghan insurrection (Yousaf & Adkin, 1992) asserts that more Afghan leaders perished in Peshawar than in battle.

Sectarianism was a second-factor influencing terrorism. In the 1990s, sectarian terrorism increased and

some of the bloodiest incidents of the decade happened (Merari, 2020). During this period, there was an average of one assault each year, with each attack causing an average of 220 fatalities.

Given its closeness to war-torn Afghanistan at the time, it is not surprising that most terrorist assaults happened in what was then known as the Northwest Frontier Province (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa). This was the epicenter of the intellectual and logistical activities of the Afghan Mujahedeen. During this period, 40% of all terrorist attacks occurred in this region, with 30% occurring in Peshawar alone.

During this period, terrorist strikes often targeted big metropolitan areas or government facilities. Targeted were the capital cities of sixty-four countries and provinces. This indicates that one of the terrorists' principal political objectives was to humiliate and undermine the government.

The measures used provide validity to the notion that the victim was unimportant to the criminal. During this period, bombing was by far the most prevalent means of attack; about 75% of all assaults included putting explosives in moving cars (Musharraf, 2020).

7. Ethnic and Sectarian Terrorism (1990–1999)

As the 20th century came to a conclusion, terrorism directed towards certain racial or religious groups reached its zenith around the year 1990 and has since been progressively receding. This last decade may be regarded as a time of sectarian and ethnic turmoil in Pakistan since targeted violent clashes between Sunnis, Shiites, and other ethnic minorities characterized it. The mangled remains of the victims were placed near the neighbourhoods in an attempt to instil fear in their occupants. In 1992, in response to a spike in terrorism, security authorities attempted to reign it in by launching an operation, but militants responded with even more ferocity.

Over the decade, there were around 200 terrorist events every year, on average. Only one year in the prior decade had more than 200 terrorist events. Terrorism has become a prevalent societal issue, as shown by the sheer number of attacks over this period. The lowest coefficient of variation for the yearly number of terrorist occurrences across the study period is 39.3, further highlighting the pervasiveness of terrorism in contemporary society. In the last decade, the average number of fatalities per event has almost doubled. At this period, terrorism expanded from the north to the south of the country. The proportion of terrorism-related fatalities in Sindh increased from 23% to 68%, making it the most afflicted area. During those ten years, sixty per cent of all terrorist assaults happened in Karachi.

Two underlying themes may be utilized to explain the surprising increase in the number of terrorist actions committed at a particular location. The first indications of the conflict's origins were discovered inside the different groups. Academics cite rising socioeconomic and political divides between the city's ethnic groupings as a cause of Karachi's high political violence (Nawaz, 2021). Second, increasing racial and religious differences were fostered and exploited for political benefit.

This decade was also notable for the growth in the employment of shoot-and-run assassination techniques. This illustrates the distinction between sectarian and ethnic terrorism, which is characterized by well-planned, targeted violence. As stated before, when terrorists gain popular support, they attack the adversary while protecting their people. Over 70% of assaults during this period happened in national and regional capitals, as they have over the last decade.

8. Conflict in Karachi, Pakistan

Karachi has a long history of terrorism based on ethnicity. Ethnic conflicts in Karachi can only be

comprehended with an understanding of the interaction between Karachi's diverse population, the city's altering political and economic climate, and the expanding role of the state (Nunberg, 2021). Following the formation of Pakistan, around eight million Indians seeking refuge migrated to the nation. 20% of these immigrants made Sindh their permanent home. This multiethnic population, originating in central and western India and a shared language, was more educated and equipped for public service than the natives. Muhajir is the Arabic word meaning "immigrant," their designation. Due to their superior education and training, the Muhajirs held a disproportionate number of key posts in the national and provincial bureaucracies (Ahmed, 2011), while being just 4% of the population.

During the Ayub administration, sentiments moved away from the Muhajirs (1958–1969). Numerous scholars have speculated on the potential causes of this increased discontent. Akbar Zaidi considers the Green Revolution a crucial time due to its influence on the economics and culture of the Punjab. As capitalism developed across the province, social and production relations were reorganized. The Muhajir group struggled to preserve its political and social influence. People across Pakistan started flocking to Karachi for better prospects, resulting in a progressive change in the city's demographic composition. Complaints were raised with the state over its strategy of giving preferential treatment to officials in Sindh (mostly Punjabis) while assigning land.

Ayub Khan, a candidate picked from Muhajir-dominated districts of Karachi, lost the 1964 presidential election due to these issues (Record, 2019). Haq demonstrates how the relative deprivation paradigm might help us make sense of the rising disparity between Sindh's many ethnic groups over time. 28 Young Muhajir people's economic realities fell further short of their aspirations, resulting in a strong feeling of group identity and significant ethnic mobilization. Unrest in the area may be traced back to late 1964 and early 1965 when violence broke out between Pathan and Muhajir groups.

The ascent to power of the Sindhi politician Z.A. Bhutto and the activities of his administration intensified already-existing ethnic tensions. The nationalist movement in Bengal (previously East Pakistan) had also achieved its independence at this time, following years of battle against discrimination; it provided an example of how to oppose marginalization throughout the nation actively. In 1972, the Sindh Assembly enacted a bill recognizing Sindhi alongside Urdu as the province's official language. Karachi erupted in violence as a result of the Muhajir community's view that this was an effort to marginalize them further. With the establishment of the quota system, which granted rural Sindhis sixty per cent of all government positions, urban Muhajirs from the middle class felt even more disenfranchised and resentful.

During Z.A. Bhutto's administration and the months preceding the military takeover, the Urdu-speaking Muhajir populace aggressively sought to bring down his party. They have shown support for orthodox Islamist political organizations in the past. Muhajirs were the most vociferous proponents of forsaking regional identities and forging a Pakistani identity characterized by Muslim nationalism, notwithstanding their apparent cultural superiority. As sectarian and ethnic loyalties grew increasingly crucial to political rivalry, the Muhajirs established the contentious Muhajir Qaumi Movement (MQM) (Louise, 2006).

There is also evidence that the participation of the state in these ethnic conflicts is intensifying them. APMSO was founded in 1978. Following the inflow of Pashtun immigrants, a "Kalashnikov culture" arose and spread across the city, drastically upsetting the demographic equilibrium (Rosenblatt, 1989). Olzak contends that several ethnic groups in urban environments might lead to rivalry over few resources and can foster ethnic identification rather than integration (Schorn, 2021). As the following events have proven, tensions did indeed arise as a result of the massive inflow of Pashtun refugees from the war-torn

regions of Afghanistan. A student who spoke Urdu was hit and killed by a car in 1985, sparking a series of clashes between Pathans and Urdu speakers. Most Pashtuns worked in transportation, but the Urdu-speaking populace blamed them for the turmoil in the city (Riedel, 2008). As a consequence of the politicization of ideological lines, which led to the negotiation of power and resources via violence, Karachi's communities are said to have grown more reticent and aloof. As seen by the city's demographics (Sandler & Enders, 2008), ethnic groups in Karachi prefer to concentrate in distinct neighbourhoods, giving birth to ethnic enclaves.

The MQM was created in 1984 as a forum for Urdu speakers, and it has now won state and federal representation. The party continued, forming fragile coalitions with the Islamic Democratic Alliance in 1990 and the Pakistan People's Party in 1988. However, the partnership with the bandits ended in June 1992, when the military began cleaning up Karachi, reportedly to break their grip on the interior of Sindh.

9. Terror after the “War on Terror” (2000–2010)

After the September 11 attacks on the Twin Towers, the United States invaded Afghanistan because the Afghan government refused to hand up Osama bin Laden to American authorities. Pakistan once again played a frontline role in the delivery of NATO supplies to Afghanistan. As a result of Pakistan's support for violent religious organizations, this was seen as a betrayal. First, a counterattack against foreign installations was undertaken (Ursano et al., 2017). As a result of Pakistan's military efforts against both internal and foreign extremists in her tribal regions, assaults have switched to target the State and the public. Incidence rates were high throughout the decade, with a significant rise beginning in 2007.

Based on the available statistics, about sixty per cent of assaults during this decade included the use of a bomb. Pakistan has reverted to the terrorist practices of the 1980s, when explosions targeted marketplaces, mosques, cafés, and hotels, but on a far greater scale. The purpose of the bombings was to disgrace and delegitimize the Pakistani government so that it would not support the US invasion of Afghanistan. Once again, the horrible shadows created by the events in Afghanistan plagued the streets of Pakistan.

Pakistani city streets include meadows. In the 1980s, Pakistan hid and helped the Mujahedeen along its northwest and southwest borders, but it now confronts this lethal foe head-on in its metropolitan centres. Locals saw the Pakistani government's betrayal of the Jihadist cause as the root of internal upheavals. It is ironic that terrorists from Afghanistan, who invaded Afghanistan 20 years ago, today provide terrorists who attack Pakistan from the mountainous mountains between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

After September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks steadily extended from the South to the remainder of the nation, especially the Northwest and Southwest. The proportion of terrorist attacks in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has dramatically increased from 5% in the 1980s to 34% now. Terrorist organizations such as Tehrik e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) conducted the majority of their assaults within Pakistan from the Federally Administered Tribal Area. This area was chosen as the centre of the anti-terror campaign since it accounted for 24% of all attacks. Not only did terrorism rise in Pakistan, but also in Baluchistan. Baluchistan was the site of 25 per cent of all terrorist occurrences throughout the decade. However, attacks in Baluchistan were driven by a variety of motives. After the discovery of Baluchistan's vast natural resource reserves, most terrorist acts were attributed to a combination of growing Baluch nationalism, a desire for wealth and power, and a desire for territory. This will be discussed in more detail later.

Before September 11, 2001, Sindh was the principal target of terrorist attacks. This, however, altered radically. The majority occurred near the end of the decade when racial tensions were at their height

(WHO.2019).

The globalization of terrorist activities is a significant difference between the post-9/11 period and previous eras. Twenty years ago, there were around fifty non-sectarian terrorist strikes on national and regional hotspots. This tendency altered throughout this decade. Except for the federal and provincial capitals, three-quarters of the occurrences took place in metropolitan areas. Geographic dispersion stood out as well. In the country's northwest and southwest, where the insurgency was most active, 75% of the assaults occurred. When Islamists won control of Pakistan's tribal districts, terrorism in those regions spiked dramatically. Even though terrorist attacks did sometimes occur in urban areas, their extent was often limited due to the efficiency of security measures.

Pakistani army attacked Khyber Agency in 2002. In 2004, the area hosted the decisive Battle of Wana. It was the first significant increase in bloodshed against terrorists in Pakistan against a united force of Pakistani Taliban and Al-Qaeda. The Pakistani army surrounded the Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) in Islamabad in 2007. This marked the start of Pakistan's second major offensive against the resurgence of terrorist activities. The military began the operation to end the violent behaviour of mosque students who were kidnapping and attacking security agents. Due to this, the number of terrorist attacks grew from 181 in 2003 to 566 in 2010. On May 21, 2008, the TTP and the Pakistani Army declared a cease-fire, which temporarily reduced the frequency of terrorist assaults. Tensions temporarily calmed with the commencement of Operation Siraat-Mustaqeem in the Khyber Agency and subsequent operations in the Swat Valley the following year to expel the Taliban from that region.

General Musharraf's military regime outlawed violent sectarian organizations in 2001 due to intense international pressure. However, despite the constraints, the homicidal rampage continued. Although there were fewer assaults overall, they were far more lethal than in the preceding decade. This time, terrorist assaults targeted Shiites, Christians, Bolivarians, and Ahmadis. In the decade beginning in 2000, 58 mosques and other houses of worship were bombed. As previously said, 49 suicide bombs were commonly utilized during this period, making terrorists more devious and successful (Yousaf, 2017).

Long before the prohibition on sectarian terrorism was implemented, there were an average of 131.5 attacks each year from 1989 to 2000. The annual death toll has been extremely steady at about 293.3. In the decade that followed, the annual average number of events decreased to around 90, but the annual average death toll rose to 855. During the same period, sectarian terrorism resulted in an average of just two deaths per occurrence. In the years after the repeal of prohibition, the average number of fatalities per occurrence soared to over 10. Since limits on terrorist travel increased the cost of carrying out a terror operation, it seems that terrorist organizations reacted by preparing terror attacks that would result in a large number of fatalities. To justify the extra expense of carrying out a terrorist attack with a higher death toll, terrorists choose huge public gatherings as their targets.

10. Discussion:

These are some core points that were made to get the idea of the study and its consequences. Altogether, 354 editorials were read from both newspapers, 24 from The News and 14 from Dawn, which were found relevant to the Taliban issue for this study. The main domain of the study is to do a critical examination of the Taliban and the factors that urge them to create panic in the country in different situations. Their subdomain included the implementation of Sharia and its effects on the common people. The very brutal activities of the Taliban, growing extremism, and the silence of the government on political issues have

also created negativity in the country, and people feel insecure in their homeland.

In these scenarios, the migration of the people took place rapidly, especially from the Swat region.

Dawn presented the portrayal of the Taliban in this way 60: 'The Taliban specialize in barbarity and aim to destroy everything they cannot abide. They hate music, clean-shaven men, and education for girls, so they blow up CD shops and schools and attack barbers. Since they consider Sufis and their followers to be heretics, the Taliban feel it is their 'religious' duty to destroy shrines and kill devotees. They cannot tolerate Sufi music, dance, or mysticism, or the intermingling of the sexes in shrines, or what they see as mediation between the individual and the Creator.'

The main design of the study is to collect data from random people, such as officers and military people, who are working in different positions to get an idea of their points of view related to this issue. Critical analysis was done by discussing the different circumstances with them and analyzing their answers to this research. The purpose of collecting data is to get a close and true picture of the increasing militancy and decline in governance in Pakistan. Data is collected using all available print and electronic resources.

As we all know, Pakistan is the first Muslim country that emerges on the map to practice the true meaning of Islam and to set all the rules and regulations in the light of the religion. But somehow, this ideology changed, and the Taliban created a wrong image of Islam in the other world, and they have out the word extremism and terrorism along with the religion. The religion Islam presents the complete code of life and guides in all walks of life: individual, social, fiscal, political, justice, martial, etc. but on the contrary Taliban has used it on other bases and created negativity against it.

11. Good Governance a Mistreated Phase in Pakistan:

Good governance includes principles, rules, regulations, and responsibilities. Stability in the society etc. the state should have infrastructure that must be followed by all the people living inside the country to build a positive image of the country to the outer world.

11.1. Improvement

The state has the responsibility to make optimal use of its society's intellectual resources. This will include giving equal opportunities to the children to get the education that they deserve. So that is why all have equal chances according to their ability. This will also secure the society's image in the longer term.

11.2. Rule of Business Law

The institutional infrastructure instead of becoming stronger and more responsive over time outlived its usefulness due to the weak implementation of the rule of law (Myrdal, 1968). Pay and compensation packages with the rising cost of living will create positivity in the employees.

11.3. Law and Order

The country must follow the laws and orders that should be regulated in the country by the government and these orders should be enforced by the citizens and any kind of violation can be taken seriously by the government. This though helps to maintain law and order in the urban areas however putting pressure on the forces deployed to guard the frontiers. Policies are the main core for any country and individuals should feel responsible.

11.4. Damaged Tourism

Increased security concerns can also damage the tourism sector. The danger of the Taliban also affected the tourism sector, and people are reluctant to visit the areas that are in danger zone. Along with this, tourism in the country has been seriously affected as, according to estimates, less than 1% of people want

to visit Pakistan for vacation purposes only because of the security threat.

12. CONCLUSION

Nowadays, Pakistan is facing too much threat due to extremism and the issue of terrorism. The government of Pakistan must look at this issue very seriously, and the right actions have to be taken to prevent these problems and threats that are circulating inside the country.

There is a need for good governance in the country that can implement law and order inside the country for economic development because the government must show firmness between the people. Provision and equality among the citizens must be given in every aspect. It will create patriotism, and people will automatically think for their nation. The people, government, surrounding countries, and the rest of the world need a prosperous, flourishing, and strong Pakistan.

The constant war on terrorism has been following in Pakistan, and it has widened its roots. Still, the government and armed forces can restrict them and take them outside the country because Pakistan is a well-known Islamic country in the continent of Asia. It has its own identity and ideology. So, taking the right actions can help the country flourish, and the tribal system has to be restricted. Every individual must feel secure in the country because the threat of extremism and terrorism only creates panic inside the country, and people cannot do anything freely, and they will feel pressured.

Rules and regulations must be defined decently, and punishments must be punished if anyone voids those rules because these systems can create stability and improve the country. Pakistan must expand more on providing incentives and a suitable environment for jailed terrorists and radicalized members of society. As a result, a collection of reform-related concerns and proposals are offered from the perspectives of the authorities, madrassas executives and teachers, and Muftis. This research is also analytic since it will aid in refining the extant material during research.

Pakistan has to become strong in many economic, social, political, and religious areas. A good education system so children can only get a good education without bias. Such alterations are hard to explore but must be done for the nation's stability. On a social level, violent and extreme organizations receive intellectual backing. The militant organizations can wage Jihad because of social backing. Religious extremism is the underlying cause of all discernible trends and intents of radicalization in Pakistan. The mechanics of trends and patterns in Pakistan have variations but are largely interconnected. Some madrasas and mosques are powering the current flow of religion and creating the wrong image of Islam. The government should look at these matters and make wise decisions for the country's sake.

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