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Towards a Holistic Framework: Integrating Causation into Human Rights Measurement Practices

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Abstract

Human rights studies have increasingly relied on statistical methods such as indicators and benchmarks to measure performance. This empirical approach reflects the current trend in the field. However, the issue of causation is often overlooked in the creation of statistical techniques, which can lead to serious problems. This article suggests that fiscal or temporal resources would be better spent improving techniques for identifying human rights violations rather than creating complicated and ultimately futile statistical methods for tracking human rights achievement. In recent times, the study of human rights has witnessed a surge in the use of statistical techniques, such as indicators and benchmarks, to measure the performance of various actors. This empirical approach has become increasingly popular in the field, reflecting the growing importance of quantitative data in assessing progress. However, despite these techniques' apparent benefits, causation is often overlooked in their creation and application. This can have serious implications for the validity and reliability of such schemes.

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1. Introduction

The UK, in its report 2008, told the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights that, amongst other things, it had different strategies to minimize the inequalities of health outcomes by ten percent, then 57 percent of fifteen-year-old students received A to C grades or equivalent during 2005 to 2006. Additionally, the percentage of households eligible for homelessness assistance has decreased by 43% since 2007. This is not at all uncommon. The interregional human rights organization, in its broadest sense, is interested in gross results. This phenomenon views human rights study as a process of using statistical methods to assess performance beyond populations. Even though the International Treaty on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) recently included an individual complaints system, the interregional human rights organization, and research now primarily scrutinized how to keep a check on human rights performance within and between societies, communities, and populations.

In the framework of the United Nations treaty mechanism, the question of whether particular rights of a person have been violated in a particular situation is almost becoming archaic; instead, the emphasis is shifting to how well human rights are generally protected in the given country as demonstrated by quantifiable results. Over this phenomenon, Opponents have expressed worries about the collection and application of human rights statistics, about the potential for statistical indicators to obfuscate the truth or to cover up political decisions, or even about how statistics in international government ushers in the use of an innovative era of control and audit. Along with these worries, the author raises a more fundamental philosophical one; there is a theoretic blind hole at the core of this movement toward outcomes measurement. Causality is that conceptual blind hole. What leads to outcomes in human rights that are statistically measured?

It can be challenging to determine and assign causation in societies that is, to draw credible irregular inferences. Since David Hume wrote, this has been recognized and acknowledged, and it is now frequently tritely summed up with the phrase relationship is not cause. It means, for example, it is difficult to determine if the UK government was truly to blame for the estimated 43% decline in households eligible for aid against homelessness between 2006 and also 2009. There are many probable correlations between the collapse and changes in government policy, the economy, and society, but it is challenging, if not impossible, to distinguish the real causes from the spurious ones. As a result, the statistics by themselves do not show anything about the performance of human rights because it is impossible to link the quantitative measures of human rights survey results.

The concept of the duty to protect, help, fulfill, and respect to some extent to elide this

difficulty, but as we should show, this elision is not specifically satisfying if real improvement in the protection of human rights is sought. Put otherwise, the system relies heavily on efficacy assessments, but these can only be done when the underlying causalities are established or credibly refuted. In recent times, social scientists across many disciplines have been progressively addressing Hume's problem of causality (The Economist, 2010) concurrently with the impending big data revolution. These days, it is commonly acknowledged that the challenge of causality and the impossibility of drawing reliable conclusions about causes and effects cannot be ignored or written off as trivial. It is especially necessary to interpret the current trend to experimental and quasi-experimental methods in the domains of political science, psychology, law and public policy as a broad rejection of the idea that econometric analysis or statistical techniques by itself can serve as a method for determining the efficacy of policy or as a guide for formulating it.

The complexity of the system and its organizations, pragmatic and other financial concerns, the reality that quasi-experimental methods do not open the black box of causality, and other factors make it unlikely that these approaches will be fruitful for the predictable future, even though they may have some promise in some fields for human rights analysis (Finkelstein et al., 2011). This implies that evaluations of the rights of human acts should continue in the domain of philosophy, politics, and all narratives above. Although statistics have certain applications in human rights monitoring, the notion that they can offer an impartial foundation for evaluating compliance is illusory. That being said, human rights performance monitoring need not be an ethereal, scholarly, or surface-level activity.

2. Observations of Different Surveys

Human rights literature of today frequently assumes that realizing and recognizing desirable results, which are often conceived via principles of the dignity of man across populations, is the first step toward fulfilling human rights. This methodology tends to obscure the individual in favor of aggregated and broader measurement. The emergence of the key treaties and the development of the current UN human rights framework are arguably the relatively recent origins of these phenomena. Similarly, article twenty-four of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) entails States Parties to take action against malnutrition. The International Covenant on Economic, social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) also explicitly requires state parties to lessen infant mortality, among other things. All of the big accords contain a few more examples. By their very nature, these requirements point to a monitoring system that is primarily concerned with the big picture; what is infant mortality and unemployment rate?

What percentage of children suffer from malnutrition? And so on.

However, the idea that compliance may be evaluated by gauging how well results are achieved has become more entrenched within institutions. The paradigm of the duties to safeguard, respect, fulfill, and protect individual rights became ingrained in the treaty organizations' procedures quite early. The first of these is the duty to respect, which is the only one that could be characterized as negative. In order to safeguard and accomplish the other two goals, States must take proactive measures to guarantee that private actors do not violate people's rights or to create an environment where rights are enjoyed; they also need to increase people's ability to exercise their rights. Even though rights belong to the individual, the duties to uphold and protect them naturally direct attention away from the individual and toward the ways in which states work to strengthen or establish the conditions necessary for individuals to exercise their rights.

One barely needs to point out that those requirements also inherently imply the need for measurement; the question of how well a particular state party is developing is one that should be at least partly addressed through specifically quantitative research. As a result, improving human rights results should be the goal of States Parties, and the emphasis should be on State commitments and the degree to which they are being achieved. This is frequently referred to as a duty bearer viewpoint. The main argument of this viewpoint is that the enjoyment of the rights by right holders, or regular citizens, should not be the only issue. Its focus is instead on the State's efforts to achieve those aims. That is to say, the emphasis is primarily on the actions taken by the State to enhance results, not on specific rights violations; rather, the question is whether the State is successful in fostering an atmosphere that allows people to exercise their rights and in enhancing their ability to do so.

Practically speaking, however, the UN human rights organization is not technically and legally designed to be focused on enforcing individual treaty compliance. Given that the belief persists, at least doctrinally, that an individual's human rights belong to them rather than to the group, this is a somewhat incorrect remark. Nevertheless, the treaty bodies have a tendency to adopt a broad viewpoint because of their structure and function. Due to the way in which the treaties were drafted, legal violations of specific individuals' rights are presently only relevant in elective individual connection procedures. Additionally, the treaty bodies do not currently have the resources or ability to concentrate on the specifics of individual cases.

Therefore, it makes sense that within the framework of the international human rights organization, the idea of human rights like Dworkinian protections that belong to individuals and give them precedence over the State should give way to a conception of rights just like

mechanisms for the guiding policy; like instruments for improving the direction of agreed-upon outcomes. As a result, the character of human rights monitoring shifts. This has consequently naturally raised interest in measuring human rights results generally within the discipline, especially quantitative measurably. This is evident in the routine work of the UN treaty body. For example, in its decided inspections on the most recent report of the UK (CESCR, 2009), the CESCR calls on the UK to reduce the gender pay gap in private sector and provide all information on how pension reform affects marginalized and disadvantaged groups and also fulfill its promises to reduce all health inequalities by ten% by 2009. The issue of gender inequality is evident in relevant State reports. One such report includes a page full of statistics about paternity and maternity leave arrangements with the following example: the overall length of maternity wage leave is 6 months up from 4 months in 2003, the proportion of fathers taking a minimum of 2 weeks from 21% to 38% in three years. According to 77 percent of mothers, they are of the opinion that dads are capable of raising a child. The former seeks to develop a method for ranking the States according to how well they are adhering to ICESCR, as well as a tool for measuring the fulfillment of social and economic rights (Randolph, Fukuda-Parr & Terra 2009).

Another example is the emerging discipline of human rights analysis of budget, which has gained popularity among some domestic human rights institutions, as well as in the United Nations human rights organization, the academic community, and also in the human rights system itself (SAHRC, 2011). This clearly fits into a larger trend in the arts and social sciences generally toward an extra utilization of empirical techniques that have emerged among legal scholars in the last 20 years (Stevens, 2008). Like everywhere else, a subject that was formerly characterized almost solely by normative suggestions or doctrinal debate has become measurement-obsessed. Better statistics results show that, overall, a right which is seen as a component of safeguard to dignity man; however that term is defined is being fulfilled. This is an indication of improved human rights performance.

A higher percentage of women and the members of target groups holding seats in parliament suggest that the right towards engagement in affairs of the public is fulfilled, and a larger percentage of people utilizing improved sources of drinking water (United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 2011) suggest progress in right to proper housing. This evolution can be seen in the work done by practitioners, academics, or by treaty bodies (HRDAG, 2014). In turn, human rights are almost conceived as guiding principles of public policy and statements of social justice objectives whose advancement can be quantified.

3. Causality and Its Consequential Perspective

There has been some criticism of the approach of causality. Meckled Garcia depicts in results view an important tendency that undermines the idea of Human Rights as rights. This is due to the fact that the field of human rights frequently treats causality very loosely and ignores the State's accountability for the results that are seen. There are particular theological foundations for this. Many of human rights researchers agree that when a State violates an international agreement, it becomes accountable for its conduct. In other words, the difference between private and public actors that was established in human rights law by the Articles on State Responsibility 2001 is essentially eliminated in modern human rights law. States Parties (Farrior, 1998) to the fundamental human rights treaties are required to guarantee and safeguard the rights that they carry. If these rights are not guaranteed then there has been a breach for which the State is responsible. It doesn't matter if a private landlord participated in slum clearance that resulted in people being homeless. The environment necessary for the upholding, respecting, and fulfillment of the right to housing was not established since the State failed to offer sufficient legal protections or substitute social housing.

Consequently, the State breached its duties concerning that entitlement. Regardless of the side state responsibility is nearly invariably involved. It is important to reiterate the three duties: fulfillment, protection, and respect. These duties show that a State breaches them simply by failing to establish an environment that protects the rights of the people that it is in charge of. This implies that it is possible to demonstrate the existence of a violation using only statistical data and to ignore causation. There is objectively verifiable evidence that the State has violated the requirements required for the enjoyment of rights (ECtHR, 1998) or that it is not exerting due effort to stop private actions that impede that enjoyment, either by act or omission. Therefore, the duties of the states are seen as calls to improve on various statistical measures. Ignoring or being unaware of causality is problematic from a philosophical as well as a practical one.

First of all, deriving any specific human rights performance metric from cause variables is nonsensical. It is encouraging because, for example, 43% fewer households are now eligible for support in preventing homelessness. But in order to see this number drop even further, the concerned government or treaty body system of monitoring needs to figure out why it is falling. Second, it is evident that the prevailing notions of justice and equity are at odds with assigning blame or granting credit where credit is not deserved. Ultimately, there is no gain to the UN human rights organization in destroying its own credibility with statistically determined outcomes whose causality is open to question. Third it also should go without saying that

anyone entrusted with protecting human rights must naturally be curious about the truth. There are compelling legitimate reasons, though. Firstly, ideological reasons holding states generally accountable for the extent of human rights protection within their borders should not weaken the need to demonstrate a causal relationship between a State's conduct or inaction and the evaluation in question. The CEDAW is one such instance, which specifically requires State Parties to outlaw discrimination against women. To put it another way, it requires them to take all reasonable steps to change or eliminate laws and policies that discriminate against people. They also need to alter the cultural and social patterns of activity of women and men in order to erase prejudices and other similar behaviors.

Given this, it is easy to ignore the question of causality because the public and private division is manifestly unrelated to these needs. This, however, misses the more important issues with social and cultural behavioral patterns as well as the fact that discriminatory norms and behaviors are actually modifiable. What leads to the beginning of a discriminatory practice? Why does it continue to occur? And what could cause it to disappear? The nature of the obligations of States Parties under the numerous treaties, as well as our concern for best practices and the most efficient course of action, are the reasons for our interest in these issues. It is evident that understanding and assessing how a State's actions impact the protection of relevant rights is the only way to ascertain if those actions are genuinely contributing to the progressive fulfillment of such rights.

Not only must States spend all available resources on achieving their rights object, but they must also take steps to progressively realize their rights. The CRC Committee effectively expressed view that, due to the same obligation in the Covenant, these kinds of conditions can be measured simply by recognizing the parts of the State's budget that are allocated to the fulfillment of rights (CRC, 2003, para.51). It is evident that none of all this is possible without a system for assessing article 2 of the CERD, for example, mandates that States Parties use appropriate mechanisms to abolish racial discrimination, such as taking effective efforts to amend or repeal laws that support or legitimize such discrimination or to promote the removal of racial obstacles. Again, similar requests unavoidably give rise to questions like, what are the strategies for breaking down racial barriers and, What legislative provisions encourage or support racial discrimination and how may they be amended in a way that is equitable and effective? Of course, determining cause and effect is necessary in order to respond to such queries. Similar obligations are found in the CEDAW, which include guaranteeing equal rights for women and men in education, among many other areas, modifying the cultural and social patterns of women's and men's conduct, and taking all appropriate measures to end

discrimination against females by any individual group or enterprise. Since all these obligations are substantive in addition to de jure it is necessary to assess the appropriateness of the actions taken, and this can be done by understanding the cause and effect. According to Article 8 of the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW convention, the CEDAW committee's investigation into the murder, kidnapping, and rape of women in Northern Mexico offers an intriguing example of why it is crucial to understand cause and effect when determining whether or not appropriate steps are taken. This brief instance highlights the challenges in effectively translating covenant duties into a procedure for ascertaining if a violation has transpired when the fundamental mechanics of causation and consequence are not readily discernible. The Committee expresses concern that the anti-discrimination provisions of the treaty may compel State Parties to take required and effective steps to overcome all types of gender-based violence, whether private or public act.

Without knowing the real outcomes of gender-specific violence of the police presence or the underlying causes of the high ratio of gender-specific violence in the city, it is not possible to evaluate whether the federal police presence is appropriate or effective and, consequently, whether Mexico is fulfilling its obligations. Reducing gender-based violence necessitates justifying the federal police's existence, which means demonstrating their superiority over other options. These criteria are critical for employing indicators because, without a clear causal relationship between the indicator and the policy, they almost always apply to any attempt to quantify human rights. Without such a relationship, indicators are useless for assessing the effectiveness of government programs. This is explicitly true for indicators that fit into the outcome, process, and structure categories. To put it another way, the structure, process, and outcome paradigm is useless for analyzing performance unless it takes into account the relationship between structural indicators, commitments, and improved policies, which in turn leads to better outcomes. It is impossible to prove this without understanding the underlying causal relationship. The OHCHR's guide states that the "prevalence of stunted and underweight children under 5 years of age is an outcome of indicator for nutrition characteristic under the right to food. Four process indicators, the part of the targeted population that met daily energy recommendations, the portion that received public nutrition supplementations, and the proportion that took part in public awareness, education, and campaigns about public nutrition, have a strong correlation with each other. It also has two associated process signs linked to the outcome marks under the Right to Food.

Setting aside issues with data collection, the central inquiry here should be the extent to which the process indicators, such as coverage of the public programs on awareness about nutrition

education, actually contribute to or reason for outcome, the prevalence of stunted and underweight children below five years of age. Without a clear understanding of this, the procedure indicator effectively reveals no information about the performance, positive or negative and is thus meaningless as a performance indicator. Similar to this, public education and also an awareness campaign on nutrition may reach 100% of the population, but it may have a significant impact on a child's nutrition, little effect, or no effect at all until the program's impact on the prevalence of stunted and underweight children below the age of five. Understanding the underlying causation may be especially important when it comes to the Human Rights budget survey, or the influence might even be negative if the program's teaching content is inaccurate. Again, there appears to be the best case for resource allocation-based monitoring in this instance, but in practice, this calls for a firm understanding of casual sequence. For example, Kempf proposes an information three layered approach that divides rights into three categories: expanded indicators, context, and key measures. Measuring governmental expenditure typically falls in the middle of all these categories and offers a deeper understanding of factors influencing the key indicators (Kempf, 1998). This would lead to the measurement of education rights, for example, through the use of case studies, the literacy rate, and government spending on transportation, lunch programs, and education (Apodaca, 2007). In this instance, it is evident that knowledge of the relationship between government spending and the literacy rate is required to provide an appropriate and accurate assessment of the performance. It seems unlikely that investing in in useless teaching strategies, for instance, will raise the literacy rate because underdeveloped countries are not the only ones who have this problem.

However, this line of reasoning will always be necessary when attempting a comprehensive analysis of the budget from a human rights standpoint; a few minutes of thought work will produce instances of why reliable causal deductions are needed if the survey is to be done through statistical results (Tooley, 2009). For example, increases in literacy rates may not be associated with government spending in areas where private tutoring and schools are popular. What effect does a program's government funding have on the unemployment rate? In what ways could finance for a certain field of medicine save the time patients have to wait for routine procedures? What if you had made any other use of the money? If the local education authorities give their approval, is it a better use of funds to construct a new school in the place of the crumbling old one instead of employing more teachers? These kinds of questions are always present in every process that seeks to ascertain if the optimal course of action has been chosen or whether spending is both efficient and successful. But assessing them wouldn't be

possible if we didn't understand the mechanisms behind the related human rights implications. This is particularly true when analysts attempt to disaggregate spending for purposes such as gender-responsive budgeting or related activities that necessitate analyzing aspects such as the impact of given budgetary products on individuals with disabilities or gender inequality.

All types of measures double analytical burden because they demand a sophisticated comprehension of the combined effects of funding in general and to disagree in groups. Finally, it is critical to stress that, to the extent that treaty bodies have typically maintained, States are required to protect, defend, and implement rights, then a large portion of the conversation that has preceded us concerning causality and role of non-state factors equally applies. This is particularly true when a treaty provision's wording implies that public and private actors should not be held differently from one another when it comes to State accountability. Of course, related problems include the roles that private organizations play in generating quantifiable results and the extent to which the government causes or approves of the acts of private companies. This raises the bar for complexity and necessitates more evidence and cause-and-effect understanding. This presents serious legal questions about the suitability or efficacy of a State's human rights defense, which is concerning from both a theoretical and practical perspective. Furthermore, as we will show later, an outcomes-based approach to human rights evaluation hides a variety of problems despite the seeming lack of concern.

4. The Causality Inferences and its Problems

Over the past few years, there has been a notable departure from the so-called naïve regression-based perspective of causation in policy studies, econometrics, and related fields. This simple method may have been best expressed in Leamer's well-known essay. Leamer here cast off with an example of the difference between an agricultural and an econometrician experimenter. A farmer separates his property into a smaller land parcel and then selects at random which of the plots needs fertilizer. The difference between the mean yield in fertilized and non-fertilized areas will show how much fertilizer influences agricultural output if part of the plots receive fertilizer and some do not. Leamer claims that this is grossly erroneous, despite the fact that econometricians want to think of themselves in this way (Leamer, 1983).

Stated differently, the econometricians are ignorant of the fact that, in most cases, it is impossible to identify or validate the source of a statistical trend in data analysis that does not originate from a professionally designed experiment. In actuality, monitoring human rights through statistics is comparable; because of homelessness, there are fewer households in need of assistance. It is not objective to favor one causal mechanism over another, even when various observers might deduce different processes. This is, of course, only a repetition of the

philosophical assumption that David Hume (Hume, n.d.) had made in the middle of the eighteenth century, according to which we are unable to, by our uttermost study, discern anything except one after another event.

Stated differently, it is challenging to prove a cause-and-effect relationship since there is always a chance that some obscure or unobservable element is affecting a specific outcome. While drawing conclusions about causation outside of a laboratory setting is difficult, the laboratory experiment offers a reasonable and practical solution by permitting the measurement of known components while maintaining the same values for the others.74 In short, regression surveys is a helpful technique that social scientists can apply to tackle problems involving the measurement of a variable's effect. In essence, a regression survey is a process for looking at correlations between variables; however, it typically involves trying to identify causative effects like how pricing affects demand. One example of this kind of model is one that seeks to measure the correlation between suicide and unemployment rates. This would often take the form of multiple regressions in order to ascertain the independent association between the suicide rate and unemployment rate while adjusting for variables other than unemployment such as age, sex, etc. Otherwise, it's a try by a statistician to assume the role of an agricultural experimenter, substituting an experimenter who modifies fertilization variables while leaving the others unchanged for the farmer who notices a relationship between good crop yields and roosting birds.

In order to determine causality, various regression analyses are a statistical technique that measures the influence of one variable for controlling the other variables. The issue that just not all different variables are known causes the project to grow increasingly complex; in fact, it is irrational to assume that whole volatiles are recognized. This identifies two impossible barriers to the reliable inference of causality using simple statistical analysis. The first problem, referred to as omitted volatile bias arises when hidden conditional influences the regression analysis's result and prevents any other relevant variables from being controlled, or at the very least, makes it difficult for the statistician to confirm that all relevant variables have been taken into account. Keohane and King use a hypothetical study of sub-Saharan African nations to demonstrate that areas with authoritarian regimes have a higher frequency of coup d'états (King, 1994). It is not impossible that there could be a relationship between unemployment and a higher risk of political repression and coup d'état. Accounting for unemployment would consequently be required for such a study, but this would not be feasible due to the lack of trustworthy unemployment statistics.

The researchers might not have taken into account the impact of military independence, an

extra variable that could plausibly influence the frequency related to coups d'état, even with those numbers available and unemployment controlled for. They may have had more time to consider it, but they neglected to take into consideration the possibility of compensation variations in the army, which would have impacted the likelihood of a coup d'état. There could be an abundance of unconsidered potential causes. Secondly, the results of naïve regression-based surveys are always subject to criticism since, as Leamer so eloquently pointed out, the list of rejected possible factors may never finish. It is challenging to decide whose interpretation is better because two researchers can always look at the same data and also come up with different conclusions. The main reason there isn't consensus in so many lengthy and substantial social discussions, despite a plethora of statistical evidence on both sides, is this: Pfaff addresses the question of whether owning a gun makes people more violent or if the death sentence discourages crime, offering examples specific to the US. Other examples could include if the minimum salary has an impact on employment, if abortion lowers crime, or if microfinance really benefits the poorest of the poor. Because it is so simple for them to identify the gaps in every other data and identify correlations that support their own hypotheses, neither of the sides is ever in a position to declare victory in these types of conversations. An endless list of issues arises when there are unknown variables including variable interaction. The phrase "problem of endogeneity" is more frequently employed these days, JS Mill called this difficulty intermixture of effect.

In summation, Mill claimed that when faced with complexity, humans typically attempt to assess one situation from the multitude of antecedent occurrences" in order to determine its potential cause. But in practice, causes are rarely discrete; rather, they are often more complicated and even contradictory. Manzi has also used the example of an attempt to ascertain how a brand difference influences sales in a store after adjusting for all other variables. Regarding these and associated matters, a wide range of disciplines now concur that the era of regression is over. Regression analysis is no longer regarded as a dependable way to determine causation, with very few exceptions. Instead, researchers are using it to analyze and measure the effects of many variables inside a dataset. Rather, in the last few decades, researchers studying agriculture have created more quasi-experimental procedures or improved methods of simulating or reproducing what occurs in the lab or in the field (Druckman, 2006). The very famous of them is the standard of gold randomized trial field, which is largely applied in the disciplines of public health and medicine and is precisely what Leamer's experimenter related to agriculture was doing. Choosing a group of people who are similar to one another and allocating them at random to the test group plus the control group are the steps involved in this

kind of experiment. It modifies one variable for the test group in order to isolate its effects. Theoretically, not much has changed since James Lind's attempts to treat scurvy with citrus juice. While randomized field trials are rarely perfect, especially in the medical domain, they can yield compelling evidence of causality when conducted with great care, attention to detail, and consistency. Since randomized trial fields are costly, doing them in the social sciences is usually difficult, although there are becoming more inventive methods for carrying out these sorts of studies (Frankel et al., 2001).

When conducting trials is not practical, researchers attempt to replicate a randomized field experiment by manipulating data using different strategies. Regression discontinuity survey is a popular method for calculating the impacts of a natural interruption or discontinuity in data. The study on sizes of classes in Israeli schools by Angrist and Lavy is without a doubt the most well-known and often cited of all (Angrist & Lavy, 1999). The Israeli education system severely limited classroom sizes to forty. Therefore, if a school had forty-one students registered in a particular year, it would have to divide the students in two classes, say twenty and twenty-one. However, there would only be one class with 39 students enrolled. Given that a cohort of forty-one students is likely to have an average ability similar to that of a cohort of thirty-nine students, it is reasonable to assume that the impact of class size on academic performance will be evident when comparing the academic outcomes of classes of 20 and 39. Studies have shown that students learn more effectively in smaller classes than in larger ones. Put another way, the volume of data that is currently available has made it easier to recognize discontinuities and quantify their impacts. Nonetheless, the academic literature is essentially correct, stuck in a period of regression and trailing behind advances in other domains. With the possible exception of very long-term ramifications, there are compelling considerations to support the assertion that there is no reason to assume that there will ever be a credibility revolution in the domain of people rights monitoring.

5. The Measurement of Human Rights and the Credibility Revolution

First, even in situations when experimental or quasi-experimental methods yield trustworthy results, it is well recognized that causal techniques do not always manifest by default. Often, the outcomes yield unclear or no results at all. Manzi uses a 2009 research that compared the advantages of free basic medical care in Ghana to an arbitrary control group, examining the impacts on a sample of 1,400 test participants, to provide a typical illustration of this problem. Nonetheless, there was no statistically significant improvement in the test group's health outcomes when compared to the control group. What interpretation of these results should we make? Why did people's health not seem to improve when access to free basic medical care

was available?

Manzi presents four basic theories: The findings demonstrated that: parents lied in their diary entries to suggest that they were acting in a socially responsible manner, but they were not taking their children to the recommended frequency of formal health visits indicating that free basic care was not as sufficient incentive to address; the results could not distinguish between Western and traditional medicine methods of providing healthcare in the area. Ghanaian clinics have very low standards of care, so visiting one has no or little value. Put another way, because the results lack theoretical backing, it is impossible to draw inferences about the efficacy of free primary care or utilize the information they provide to decide how best to distribute funds or develop health policy. There are, however, a number of other theoretical theories, all of which are based mostly on historical prejudices yet are at least partially reasonable. The lack of evidence surrounding the most significant of all questions—whether or not healthcare spending influences health outcomes—makes the study's conclusions all the more remarkable. Consequently, the study's findings would be of no assistance to anyone trying to ascertain whether Ghana had, to the best of its ability, implemented appropriate health-related policies.

Similar to this, the theoretical foundation of Angrist and Lavy's analysis is fundamentally straightforward and believable: in smaller courses, individual students usually receive extra attention and do better overall. Nonetheless, comprehension of the Israeli educational system is also necessary for the study. Since the findings don't always point to a causal process, it is important to postulate causality. More data from comparable studies done in different contexts might necessitate more theorization. Angrist and Lavy conducted a follow-up investigation in Chile more than ten years later. The ability of wealthy parents to enroll their kids in system schools where they are aware that there will be smaller class sizes a tactic known as enrollment manipulation that skews the results—was the rationale behind the authors' logical hypothesis as to why the results were inconsistent (Urquiola & Verhoogen, 2009). However, this revelation did not merely come from the facts; it was the product of theoretical thinking as well as first-hand knowledge of the Chilean educational system. Naturally, this suggests that a thorough understanding of the pertinent subject matter is required, particularly when it comes to data interpretation. Unlike the claims made by the OHCHR, for example, quantitative measures provide an open, unbiased, and trustworthy means of monitoring performance human rights. Actually, a reliable theoretical explication of causality and the researcher's experience in the field lend credence to a statistically supported result. When an observation lacks a compelling theoretical causal explanation that addresses the question, it can only be considered a correlational claim (Mayntz, 2004).

It also recommends that experimental or quasi-experimental approaches produce solid evidence of causal sequence, and consistent replication in a variety of contexts is required, as well recognized in the Department of Public Health. If not, the results could have been initially improbable due to unreported environmental influences. A limited reading that implies smaller class size correlate with better academic performance might only be valid in the particular historical, cultural, and social context of Angrist and Lavy's research. Nonetheless, in a limited setting, the study might provide a strong, or at least tenable, causality conclusion. Although the Chilean study indicates that parents desire their kids to attend small classes, possibly because they know that this will boost academic achievements, it does, in some ways, corroborate the findings of Angrist and Lavy. If same results are found in further research, doing the experiment under various conditions supports the conclusion. This is particularly crucial in situations like Ghana's free basic healthcare system when there isn't a well-acknowledged theoretical explanation for the result. We will only consider data-wide, consistent, and repeatable outcomes—that is, data that seem to demonstrate ongoing correlations between certain effects and policy measures—to be reliable.

This indicates that even if they gave up on fundamental statistical techniques, human rights specialists and the UN organization would probably not benefit much from this purported credibility revolution other than maybe on an as-needed basis. Even in situations that are relatively small-scale, convincingly establishing causal processes is an extremely challenging task, let alone when the scope is as broad as an international treaty on human rights. As a result, including these components makes it very difficult to evaluate human rights performance using experimental or quasi-experimental study findings. The need for consistent results and the high time and financial expenses associated with their generation are among the fundamental challenges to a valid statistical measurement of human rights. There are not enough human rights researchers with the requisite training and experience to critically evaluate other people's research designs, nor is there enough time for the treaty bodies to review the data and studies that States Parties and non-governmental organizations submit to them.

Therefore, it is just unrealistic to anticipate that extensive experimentation or quasi experimentation will yield suitable and useful solutions for the short and midterm protection of human rights. Therefore, it is impractical to anticipate that economic principles and statistical measurements will revolutionize the field of Human Rights monitoring. However, for two very important causes, it is more than just a harmless delusion. The first is straightforward, doing statistical analysis has a time and resource opportunity cost. Regression analysis is a diversion from investigating human rights breaches, thinking and theorizing

human rights, examining social phenomena in depth, and campaigning for human rights. Though this may seem apparent, not enough people have taken note of it. The second of these is the riskier. As noted before, parties to human rights treaties have a strong incentive to portray themselves as upholding their commitments. As the quantitative impact of human rights work increases, countries will depend more and more on statistical proof to demonstrate better performance. However, statistical evidence in social sciences is often spurious (primarily based on correlations devoid of a compelling causal explanation), as this research has attempted to demonstrate and as an increasing number of social scientists are willing to acknowledge.

There are two extremely risky ramifications for human rights monitoring from this. UN treaty organization encourages States Parties to create their own parts of indexes and also cite its own research, which raises some concerns. This implies that if States rely too much on statistical measurements, they may be able to sway the system by presenting conformance with objective, apparently unbiased, numerical veils. It is hardly necessary to explain how this could result in the regrettable scenario where States Parties select the courses of action that appear to improve, irrespective of the underlying issue. During the Conference on European Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), the British State representative displayed conceit when he asserted that he was the reason behind the increased number of males taking parental leave. Such manipulation not only has no influence on States Parties' actual performance, but it also calls into question the efficacy and value of human rights monitoring as an undertaking.

It is clear that donors' constant references to or implication that strong governance and, through extension, evidence of human rights performances, are significant considerations to weigh when determining whether to extend aid have an impact on developing countries' incentives to engage in all that process. However, it is relatively simple to dispute or debate statistical data on the basis of missing or mixed variables as well as for the other mistakes in research design because attempting to infer causality is inherently difficult and ambiguous. This makes it easy for States Parties to justify actions that seem to indicate a violation. Put otherwise, States Parties can easily muck up reporting procedures through a careless application of statistical measurement. It would be foolish to think that the challenges involved with human rights monitoring should be any different from the manufacturing of ambiguity, but it is nothing new in the world of regulation.

6. Conclusion

What does the monitoring of human rights teach us? First and foremost, having qualified fieldworkers and doing quality fieldwork is essential. If the recent developments in social sciences have taught us something, it is only that without a competent interpretation from

specialists with an in-depth understanding of the issue, the most dependable, well-designed, and reproduced research findings are meaningless. Put another way, nothing can take the place of deeply rooted local knowledge that offers a credible explanation for causality. Thus, in the case of statistical human rights performance measurement, experts with their explanatory theories are traditionally the only ones able to provide logical interpretations of data, in contrast to hidden rejections of the subjective expert assessment found in most statistical human rights measurement literature. This suggests that approaches that seem to be judgment proof including statistical analyses and metrics related to human rights, actually offer very little in the way of impartial examination. It may seem as though they do away with the need for laborious and inaccurate subjective expert judgment, even though, in reality, they offer very little. Second, addressing particular violations of human rights ought to come before focusing solely on the big picture. One may readily conclude that the only practical path for human rights monitoring would be to allow subjective evaluations drawn from narrative accounts to become opaque and untrustworthy, given the concrete and objective character of quantitative measures of human rights performance.108 However, this is not required; in fact, departing from purportedly objective methods of assessment may enhance the monitoring of violations of human rights, as quantitative evaluation has inherent flaws.

From what we've seen, most of Chapman's judgments about the assessment of development hold true even after two decades: it's unrealistic and not possible to handle because of the complexities and expenses involved in analyzing the data that is now accessible. Needless to say, the treaty bodies had limited access to computers and depended mostly on paper records at the time. However, Chapman's discoveries are still very relevant, as this article has attempted to show, and the issues are far more serious than a simple processing delay. Chapman also made a strong moral argument for its importance. Stated differently, the field of human rights law is concrete. By focusing on specific people who are susceptible to whims of the oppressive State it seeks to alleviate the suffering of those who suffer at its hands.

The statistical measurement is beneficial to the field of human rights. Certainly, using data to pinpoint issues is essential. For example (CEDAW, 2015), it is evidently helpful from the standpoint of public policy to know that women from a particular ethnic group have a much lower labor force participation rate than the national average or that the academic performance of disadvantaged white males is significantly worse. Nonetheless, there are compelling theoretical and practical considerations against the application of statistics and its related methods to the evaluation of human rights performance or treaty compliance. To sum up, these are the main reasons.

Above all, statistical measurement on its own can never do more than result in correlations. Since correlations do not provide a trustworthy depiction of causality, it is impossible to evaluate the effectiveness or suitability of policies using them. Therefore, based solely on statistical study, it is inappropriate to determine whether or not states are suitably and effectively safeguarding the rights of those who reside within their borders. Second, States parties to Human rights treaties stand to gain a great deal from an over-reliance upon statistics since it makes it easier to produce proof of better performance depending on flimsy, objective data that treaty bodies are neither motivated to nor have the time to carefully evaluate. There are issues with gaps in the proof of compliance as a result. Third, there's no denying that ignorance of the difficulties involved in human rights protection comes with a significant opportunity cost. Academics, activists and practitioners frequently ignore more efficient approaches while doing economic research and developing statistical measurements. The main focus of human rights monitoring has been quantification, and it appears that this trend will continue. It would be prudent for those involved in the process to take into account recent outside events and inquire as to whether, in fact, this trend is heading toward a dead end that economists and social scientists have given up on.

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